Can Consumers Learn Price Dispersion? Evidence for Dispersion Spillover across Categories

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Price knowledge is a key antecedent of many consumer judgments and decisions. This article examines consumers’ ability to form accurate beliefs about the minimum, the maximum, and the overall variability of prices for multiple product categories. Eight experiments provide evidence for a novel phenomenon we call dispersion spillover: Consumers tend to overestimate price dispersion in a category after encountering another category in which prices are more dispersed (vs. equally or less dispersed). Our experiments show that this dispersion spillover is consequential: It influences the likelihood that consumers will search for (and find) better prices and offers, and how much consumers bid in auctions. Finally, we disentangle two cognitive processes that might underlie dispersion spillover. Our results suggest that judgments of dispersion are not only based on specific prices stored in memory and that dispersion spillover does not simply reflect the inappropriate activation of prices from other categories. Instead, it appears that consumers also form “intuitive statistics” of dispersion: Summary representations that encode the dispersion of prices in the environment but that are insufficiently category specific.

Keywords: consumer learning, numerical cognition, intuitive statistics, price search, price knowledge, reference price, price dispersion, mental representation, behavioral pricing

INTRODUCTION

To make decisions, consumers often rely on their beliefs about the minimum price, the maximum price, or the overall variability of prices in a product category. This price dispersion knowledge is a central feature of many streams of research in marketing, such as the literatures on perceived price attractiveness (Janiszewski and Lichtenstein 1999), price search (Bloch, Sherrell, and Ridgway 1986), multi-attribute choice (Meyer 1981), and consumer financial decision-making (Gallagher et al. 2018; Skinner 1988). While the influence of price dispersion knowledge on consumers’ decisions is widely recognized, many questions remain about how consumers form dispersion knowledge from experience, especially in multi-category environments, and about the mental representations that underlie price judgments (Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha 2005, 92).
To illustrate, take a consumer who regularly buys red and white wines, sometimes at the local liquor store, sometimes from an online retailer. Would this consumer, after repeated shopping experiences, be able to make accurate judgments about the price dispersion of wines? Would the consumer’s judgments of price dispersion for red wines be influenced by the prices of white wines? Does it matter if prices of white wines are more dispersed or less dispersed than prices of red wines? Would the consumer’s decisions at the local liquor store be influenced by prices encountered when shopping online? And what are the cognitive processes that underlie these judgments and decisions? Are they based exclusively on the retrieval of previously-seen prices stored in memory? Or are they based also on abstract mental representations, also known as “intuitive statistics,” that summarize the general properties of price distributions in various contexts?

This article aims to make three contributions. First, we report a series of experiments that test consumers’ ability to accurately judge price dispersion in multi-category environments. When two product categories have equal price dispersion, we find that consumers can form highly accurate beliefs about price dispersion in each category. However, when two product categories have different amounts of price dispersion, we find that consumers overestimate price dispersion in the category with the smaller amount of price dispersion. We call this phenomenon dispersion spillover.

Second, we report three preregistered and incentive-compatible experiments that demonstrate downstream consequences of dispersion spillover. We find that after encountering a larger amount of price dispersion in another category, consumers are more likely to forego attractive prices, to search longer in hope of finding better alternatives that do not exist, and to overbid in auctions.

Finally, we report two experiments that disentangle two cognitive processes that might underlie dispersion spillover. According to the first process, judgments of price dispersion are determined by the weighted activation of previously encountered prices stored in memory. According to the second process, judgments of price dispersion are also informed by “intuitive statistics” of dispersion: Abstract cognitive representations that summarize the prices that consumers have encountered. These two processes make different predictions. For instance, the activation of prices from another category would predict that consumers also perceive more price dispersion when two categories have a different (vs. identical) average price. In contrast, the formation of intuitive statistics suggests that people may report “phantom prices” that never appeared in any of the two categories but that are consistent with their summary impression of dispersion. Our studies suggest that the exemplar-based process cannot fully account for the dispersion spillover and provide evidence that dispersion spillover appears to be driven in part by intuitive statistics.

**CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT**

Prices are some of the most important inputs in consumers’ judgments and decisions, but they are not inherently evaluable (Hsee and Zhang 2010). For this reason, the perceived attractiveness of a price is based on a comparison, either to external standards, such as the price of another item presented next to it, or to internal standards, such as a consumer’s belief about the average price in the category. Internal standards are often referred to as price knowledge (Dickson and Sawyer 1990) and reflect the information that consumers have accumulated about prices. In the sections below, we first position our investigation within existing marketing literatures on price knowledge and identify knowledge gaps that our investigation of price dispersion learning intends to fill. We then hypothesize, based on relevant literatures in cognitive science, two cognitive mechanisms that make diverging predictions about price dispersion judgments in multi-category environments.

**Single-Value Models of Price Knowledge**

When evaluating a price, consumers may rely on their belief about the “average price,” or the “habitual price” for a comparable good in comparable circumstances. This point of comparison is often called the “internal reference price” (IRP; Kalyanaram and Winer 1995). Decades of research in marketing have debated how past prices are integrated into IRPs, how many IRPs consumers possess, whether consumers form IRPs at the brand, category, or store-level, and the conditions under which IRPs drive judgments and decisions (see Mazumdar et al. 2005 for a review).

A common feature of IRP models is that they are “single-value” models of price knowledge: Past prices are integrated into a single reference point, the “habitual” or “expected” price, against which target prices are then compared (Monroe 1973). This view is informed by a longstanding literature in psychology and cognitive science describing people as “intuitive statisticians” (Birnbaum 1976; Peterson and Beach 1967; Winkler 1970) who possess a natural ability to efficiently summarize the multiple numerical distributions that they encounter into “intuitive averages” (Malmi and Samson 1983).

**Price Dispersion Knowledge and Consumer Choice**

In addition to beliefs about the “average” or “habitual” price in a category, consumers’ judgments and decisions can also be influenced by their beliefs about the minimum, the maximum, and the overall dispersion of prices in a category. This dispersion knowledge plays an important role in various marketing literatures.
First, experimental research has demonstrated that consumers’ judgments of price attractiveness are not only based on the average price in a category but also on the category’s perceived price dispersion. Janiszewski and Lichtenstein (1999), for instance, showed that consumers judge the same price as less attractive when the minimum price they have encountered in the category is lower. Others have demonstrated that consumers judge a price as less attractive when they have been exposed to a larger number of cheaper prices (Niedrich, Sharma, and Wedell 2001; Schley, de Langhe, and Long 2020).

Second, prior research has connected consumers’ perceptions of price dispersion to consequential decisions. In this line of work, consumers’ beliefs about price dispersion are often measured using Likert scales (e.g., “The price of [the item] is likely to vary significantly from one store to another in the marketplace”; Srivastava and Lurie 2001). Researchers have found that these measures of perceived price dispersion correlate with perceptions of a store’s price image (Hamilton and Chernev 2013), persistence during price search (Urban, Dickson, and Kalaparakal 1996), and the perceived availability of low prices (Biswas, Dutta, and Pullig 2006; Urban, Bearden, and Weibaker 1988).

Finally, formal models of consumer decision-making often assume that dispersion knowledge plays a role. In multi-attribute choice models, a consumer’s expectation about an attribute (e.g., price) is often represented using two parameters: one for the expected (average) value of the attribute and a second summarizing uncertainty about the value of the attribute (effectively the mean and variance in consumers’ beliefs; Erdem and Keane 1996; Meyer 1981, 1982). These models are typically calibrated and validated on choice data. For multiple reasons, however, it is difficult to derive conclusions about consumers’ ability to learn dispersion from the parameter estimates of these models. To start, these estimates are contingent upon the assumptions of the models, which might not correspond to reality. For instance, Meyer and Sathi (1985) assume perfect memory for previous attribute values and Erdem and Keane (1996) assume that beliefs are formed independently across product categories. In addition, the variability parameters might capture not only beliefs about price dispersion but also other inputs of decision-making (e.g., risk preferences). Finally, the accuracy of price dispersion knowledge is difficult to assess in the context of observational data because researchers do not know the exact prices that consumers have sampled prior to making their choices.

Are Judgments of Price Dispersion Accurate?

While various marketing literatures have recognized the importance of dispersion knowledge for understanding consumer decisions, many questions remain about how consumers form dispersion knowledge from experience, and whether consumers’ dispersion knowledge corresponds to reality.

A few experiments in cognitive science have examined people’s ability to learn the properties of numerical distributions. In a typical study, participants are first presented with a sequence of numbers and then asked questions about the central tendency and dispersion of these numbers. A general conclusion from this literature is that people’s judgments of central tendency tend to be highly accurate (Levin 1974; Peterson and Miller 1964; Spencer 1963), but that people struggle to accurately report the “variance” or the “standard deviation” of a distribution of numbers (Beach and Scopp 1968; Kareev, Arnon, and Horwitz-Zelig 2002; Lovie 1978; Lovie and Lovie 1976). However, this result may reflect that “variance” or “standard deviation” are statistical conventions that do not correspond to how consumers would naturally describe their impressions of dispersion. It is therefore difficult to draw conclusions about people’s ability to learn dispersion from these findings. More recently, a study by Goldstein and Rothschild (2014) demonstrated that people can reproduce a numerical distribution with high accuracy if they are allowed to express their beliefs in ways that are more intuitive to them. Specifically, the authors tested a graphical elicitation technique that invites people to build a histogram of the distribution by allocating “balls” (representing frequencies) to “buckets” (representing values or ranges of values).

To the best of our knowledge, no studies have examined people’s ability to form accurate beliefs about dispersion for multiple categories. The question of how dispersion knowledge is formed across multiple categories is particularly relevant in the context of prices, and the category specificity of price knowledge has been identified as an important future research direction (Mazumdar et al. 2005, 92). For instance, a simple trip to the grocery store will expose a consumer to prices from dozens of product categories, and consumers often encounter prices for the same products across a variety of shopping environments (both online and offline). To make effective decisions, it is not enough to have knowledge about the overall amount of price dispersion: consumers’ judgment of price dispersion need to be category and context specific. This is especially important because price dispersion can be highly heterogeneous across product categories and purchase environments. For instance, wine prices tend to be more variable for whites than for reds (Jaeger and Storchmann 2011), flight prices tend to be more variable for unpopular destinations than for popular destinations (Borenstein and Rose 1994), prices tend to be more variable in online stores than in brick-and-mortar stores (Zhuang, Leszczyc, and Lin 2018), and some stores offer a much wider range of prices than others (Ancarani and Shankar 2004).
The Role of Exemplars and Intuitive Statistics in Judgments of Dispersion

Another under-researched area in the domain of price knowledge is the cognitive mechanisms that underlie price judgments (Mazumdar et al. 2005, 92), and judgments of price dispersion in particular. Building on the literature in cognitive science about knowledge representation (Goldstone, Kersten, and Carvalho 2012; Lamberts 1997; Markman 2013; Murphy 2004; Ross and Makin 1999), we identify two possible mechanisms.

First, according to exemplar-based models of judgment (Gillund and Shiffrin 1984; Hintzman 1984; Justlin, Olsson, and Olsson 2003; Medin and Schaffer 1978; Murdock 1995), judgments of price dispersion may be based on specific prices that people have encountered and stored in memory, and reflect the weighted activation of these memory traces. For instance, a consumer’s likelihood judgment of finding a white wine priced at $4 may be computed from the number of memory traces associated with white wines that are cheaper (vs. more expensive) than $4. At the extreme, if all memory traces involve prices higher than $4, a consumer might conclude that a price of $4 is unlikely to exist in the category.

Second, judgments of price dispersion may be based on higher-order representations, or “intuitive statistics” (Gigerenzer and Murray 2015; Peterson and Beach 1967) that summarize the price distributions that consumers have encountered. This process involves abstractions from the concrete prices in a category, and thus corresponds to prototype-based models of category knowledge (Rosch et al. 1976), or to the notion of ensemble representations in visual perception (Alvarez 2011). As mentioned earlier, formal models of consumer behavior generally assume the existence of these summary representations. In models of multi-attribute choice, for instance, consumers’ beliefs about the distribution of an attribute (e.g., the gas efficiency of cars, or the price of houses) are generally represented using two parameters, one representing the average value that consumers expect, and another representing the expected variability of the attribute (Erdem and Keane 1996; Meyer and Sathi 1985; Roberts and Urban 1988). On the one hand, there is considerable evidence that people form and use “intuitive averages” in domains as diverse as perceptions of object sizes (Ariely 2001), colors (de Gardelle and Summerfield 2011), spatial orientations (Parkes et al. 2001), perceptions of emotions or gender balance in crowds (Haberman and Whitney 2007), duration and tone of sequence of sounds (Piazza et al. 2013), and price perception (Kalyanaram and Winer 1995). On the other hand, the formation of “intuitive variances” and their potential role in driving judgments of price dispersion in multi-category environments have not been empirically examined.

Cross-CATEGORY Influences in Judgments of Dispersion

Both the exemplar-based model and the prototype-based model allow that prices encountered in one product category could affect judgments of price dispersion for another product category. However, the two models make different predictions about the specific nature of these influences across categories.

According to the exemplar model, judgments of price dispersion in a category are based on the memory traces of the prices that are associated with the category. If the memory traces are properly linked to the categories in which the prices were encountered, people’s judgments of dispersion should be independent across categories. However, the activation of the memory traces might be insufficiently category specific, such that prices encountered in one category would influence the judgments of price dispersion in another category. In a case where two categories would have the same average price, but different levels of price dispersion, we would expect an assimilation effect, such that people judge the price dispersions of the two categories as more similar than justified. In addition, such cross-category activation of exemplars predicts other effects. For instance, people’s judgments of price dispersion will depend on whether the two categories have the same (vs. different) average price. Indeed, activating memory traces from another price distribution with a larger or smaller mean would inflate judgments of price dispersion in both categories.

According to the prototype-based model, judgments of dispersion would be based on “intuitive statistics” that summarize the amount of price dispersion that people have faced. If these “intuitive statistics” of dispersion are insufficiently category specific, we might again observe assimilation effects in dispersion learning. These assimilation effects, however, would manifest themselves differently from the ones predicted by the exemplar model. First, we would not necessarily expect that people provide higher judgments of dispersion when two categories have different (vs. identical) means. Second, we might observe that these assimilation effects lead people to report “phantom prices”: values that never appeared in any of the two categories, but that are consistent with the overall impression of dispersion that people formed. In particular, some of these phantom prices may be more extreme than any of the prices they encountered across categories. Such extrapolation beyond the range of existing exemplars is a characteristic feature of prototype models of learning (DeLosh, Busemeyer and McDaniel 1997; Hahn and Chater 1998; Juslin et al. 2003). If observed, such phantom prices would constitute evidence that people’s impressions of dispersion are not only grounded in exemplar prices but also informed by “intuitive statistics” of dispersion.
SUMMARY OF STUDIES

This article presents eight experiments. In a typical study we first present participants with prices from two different product categories. We then examine the accuracy of participants’ judgments of price dispersion, and test if consumers’ judgments of price dispersion in one category are influenced by the prices in the other category. We present these eight experiments in three parts.

Part 1 (studies 1A–1C) examines people’s ability to accurately judge the price dispersions of two product categories. When both categories have similar price dispersions, we find that participants’ judgments of dispersion closely match the actual price dispersions in each category. When prices in one category are more dispersed than in the other, we find an asymmetric assimilation effect that we call dispersion spillover: Participants overestimate the price dispersion of the category that had a lower amount of price dispersion. For instance, participants in study 1B were more likely to report seeing a white wine priced at $13—while the cheapest white wine they saw was in fact priced at $17—when the price range for red wines was greater than for white wines.

Part 2 (studies 2–4) presents incentive-compatible studies that examine how dispersion spillover influences consumer decisions. When people see more dispersed prices in another category, we find that they wait too long before buying a plane ticket (study 2), reject objectively attractive compensation offers (study 3), and place excessive bids in an auction for a gift card (study 4).

Part 3 (studies 5 and 6) examines the mental representations that underlie dispersion spillover. In study 5, we test a prediction of the exemplar model, and examine whether people judge price dispersion to be higher when the two categories have different (vs. similar) average prices. We do not find this result. In study 6, we test a prediction of the prototype model and examine whether people report “phantom” prices that are more extreme than the prices that appeared in any of the two categories. We find this result. We conclude that judgments of dispersion are based in part of the formation and application of “intuitive statistics” of dispersion. However, the dispersion spillover we observe suggests that these representations are insufficiently category specific.

PART 1: DISPERSION SPILLOVER

We conducted three experiments that share the same critical features and yield similar results. These experiments are presented in aggregate for brevity. In these studies, participants are first exposed to prices from two categories (a learning phase), and then answer questions about the two price distributions they saw (a test phase). Prices in one category were identical for all participants. We call this the “common” category. Prices in the other category were manipulated between participants. We call this the “manipulated” category. This experimental design allows us to examine whether and how the amount of price dispersion in the manipulated category influences participants’ judgments of price dispersion in the common category.

For each study, we recruited 300 respondents from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and paid them 50 cents (study 1A) or 70 cents (studies 1B and 1C) for their participation. We did not record any demographic or psychographic variables.

Learning Phases

Participants in all studies learned 26 prices for a “common” category and 26 prices for a “manipulated” category. Prices in the common category were identical for all participants and had a medium amount of price dispersion (with prices ranging between $17 and $34, SD = 4.5). Prices in the manipulated category varied between participants and could have a high amount of price dispersion (with prices ranging between $13 and $38, SD = 7.5), a medium amount (with prices ranging between $17 and $34, SD = 4.5), or a low amount of price dispersion (with prices ranging between $23 and $28, SD = 1.1).

The labels assigned to the two product categories varied across studies. In studies 1A and 1B, the categories were labeled as “red wines” and “white wines.” In study 1C, the categories were labeled as “pillows” and “blankets.”

The way prices were presented to participants also varied across studies. In study 1A, participants saw one price at a time, each displayed for 1.2 seconds, with prices from both categories intermixed, in a random order. Each price was displayed together with a picture of the corresponding item (i.e., a bottle of red or white wine), and participants were encouraged to say the prices aloud as they viewed them. The presentation of prices in study 1B was identical to study 1A, except that participants first saw the 26 prices of one category and then saw the 26 prices of the other category. The presentation of prices in study 1C was also identical to study 1A, except that participants could view the prices at their own pace (taking, on average, 93 seconds to view all 52 prices).

Test Phases

The way we elicited participants’ beliefs about price dispersion varied across studies. In study 1A, we asked participants to report the “most expensive” and the “cheapest” price they saw in each category (i.e., most expensive white

1 To avoid any possibility that pre-existing beliefs about these products would introduce a bias, we counterbalanced in all three studies which label was assigned to the manipulated versus the common category. We never observed any main or interaction effect of this counterbalancing factor and, therefore, do not elaborate on it.
wine, most expensive red wine, cheapest white wine, cheapest red wine). In studies 1B and 1C, we measured participants’ beliefs about the entire distribution of prices in each category with a distribution builder (Goldstein and Rothschild 2014). This graphical user interface allows participants to create a histogram by allocating a fixed number of “balls” (representing frequencies) to “buckets” (representing possible values or ranges of values). In these studies, we asked participants to create two histograms of the “prices that they remember seeing” in each of the two categories, by allocating 26 markers (one for each price presented in the learning phase) to 25 buckets (corresponding to prices from $1 to $49, in increments of $2; see figure 1 for an illustration).  

Results

Each participant reported their beliefs about the manipulated category and the common category. If participants’ dispersion knowledge is accurate, we should observe two patterns. First, participants should report that prices in the manipulated category have a wider range when the prices they saw in this category had a high (vs. medium vs. low) price dispersion. Second, participants should report a similar price range for the common category, regardless of the amount of price dispersion in the manipulated category.

In study 1A, we computed the perceived price range of each category by subtracting the “cheapest price” from the “most expensive price” that each participant reported. We excluded data from seven participants for incoherent responses (i.e., reporting a maximum price that was strictly lower than the minimum price for at least one of the two categories). In studies 1B and 1C, we computed the perceived price range of each category by subtracting the smallest value that people entered in the distribution builder from the largest value. Data of 10 participants in study 1B and 4 participants in study 1C were not properly recorded because of a technical glitch. All exclusions were performed prior to analysis. The final sample sizes were 293, 290, and 296 in studies 1A, 1B and 1C respectively.

Figure 2 shows the average price ranges reported by participants, split across studies (1A, 1B, 1C), categories (manipulated vs. common), and conditions (low vs. medium vs. high price variance in the manipulated category). For

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2 A demo of the experimental procedure used in study 1b is available here: https://dispersion-spillover-preview.herokuapp.com/logout.

3 One advantage of using distribution builders is that we can measure perceived dispersion using other metrics than the range. In the web appendix (available on the OSF repository), we present analyses for various measures of dispersion (i.e., standard deviation, variance, minimum and maximum price). Our results and conclusions are unchanged when considering these alternative measures of dispersion.
the manipulated category, we find that reported price ranges were appropriately wider when the price dispersion in this category was indeed higher. This suggests that people were sensitive to the actual amount of price dispersion in the manipulated category. However, we find that people’s perception of price range in the common category was inappropriately influenced by the price dispersion of the manipulated category. More specifically, we observe a dispersion spillover: Participants reported a wider price range for the common category when the prices in the manipulated category had a high amount of price dispersion.

Mixed linear models with category type (common vs. manipulated) as a within-participant factor, the actual price dispersion of the manipulated category (low vs. medium vs. high) as a between-participant factor, and the interaction between these two factors as predictors revealed consistent results across all three studies. We report individual results for studies 1A, 1B, and 1C respectively within square brackets. As observed in Figure 1, participants created significantly wider ranges for the manipulated category when the actual price dispersion in the manipulated category was high versus medium versus low ($M_{\text{high}}$ for studies 1A, 1B, 1C = [20.42, 22.26, 22.31] vs. $M_{\text{med}}$ = [15.10, 17.28, 16.40] vs. $M_{\text{low}}$ = [10.44, 10.21, 10.84], $p = [< .001, < .001, < .001]$ for all pairwise comparisons between low/medium/high, standardized $b$ for smallest pairwise difference = [.77, .70, .82]). The dispersion spillover was also significant: Across all three studies, participants reported wider ranges for the common category when the actual price dispersion in the manipulated category was high versus medium ($M_{\text{high}}$ = [18.34, 19.51, 19.33] vs. $M_{\text{med}}$ = [14.77, 16.82, 16.72]; $z = [4.77, 3.14, 3.07]$, $p = [< .001, .002, .002]$; standardized $b = [.59, .38, .39]$). Finally, participants created similar ranges for the common category when the actual price dispersion in the manipulated category was medium versus low ($M_{\text{med}}$ = [14.77, 16.72, 16.82] vs. $M_{\text{low}}$ = [14.99, 16.86, 15.27], $p = [.767, .869, .076]$).

In sum, studies 1A–AC present mixed evidence regarding people’s ability to learn price dispersion. When participants saw prices from two categories with equal dispersion (i.e., the manipulated category had medium dispersion), we
find that their judgments of price dispersion are highly accurate: 42% of participants were < $1 off from the actual price range, and the median participant missed the actual price range by < $3. When prices in the manipulated category were more dispersed than in the common category, we observe a dispersion spillover: participants overestimated price dispersion in the common category. This spillover is asymmetric: observing a smaller amount of price dispersion in the manipulated category did not change people’s perception of the price range in the common category. We return to this asymmetry in the third part of the article, in which we examine the cognitive foundations of judgments of price dispersion. In the web appendix [available on the Open Science Framework (OSF) repository], we present a study (study A1) showing that dispersion spillover also occurs when two categories have the same price range, but a different amount of price variance (e.g., a uniform vs. quasi-normal distribution).

**PART 2: DOWNSTREAM CONSEQUENCES**

In studies 2–4, we test the downstream consequences of the dispersion spillover using preregistered, incentive-compatible, studies. Based on previous empirical results and models of decision-making, we expected that the dispersion spillover would change how long consumers search for lower prices (study 2), how long workers search for higher remunerations (study 3), and how much consumers bid in auctions (study 4). If, as our previous results suggest, participants overestimate price dispersion in a category when prices in another category are more dispersed, they should make suboptimal search and bidding decisions, as these decisions require accurate dispersion knowledge.

**Study 2: Search for Lower Prices**

Consumers often face circumstances in which they compare a currently offered price to future expected prices (e.g., signing a lease on an apartment, booking a flight ticket or a hotel room, accepting a job offer). The decision to search longer (vs. accept the price currently offered) is influenced by people’s beliefs about the availability and likelihood of finding better offers, and thus about the dispersion of prices (Grewal and Marmorstein 1994; McCall 1970; Mortensen 1970). Given the dispersion spillover we observed in previous studies, we expected that people would overestimate the availability of attractive offers in a product category when prices in another category were more dispersed. In turn, they should search longer than what is optimal and be less likely to buy at the best price available.

We tested these hypotheses in the context of flight reservations in study 2. In this study, we place participants in a naturalistic setting in which they receive daily price notifications from a travel agent, and then must book a flight for an upcoming business trip. On each of the 6 “days” leading up to the business trip, participants see the price currently offered for a flight to their destination and have to decide between booking the flight at the price currently offered or waiting until the next “day” in the hope that a better price will be offered. The study was incentive compatible: The more participants spent on the flight, the less they earned as a bonus payment. As in real life, participants tried to book the flight at the right moment to get the cheapest possible price.

**Method.** We preregistered our hypothesis, target sample size, detailed analysis plan, and expected pattern of results on as AsPredicted (Sohn, Simmons, and Nelson 2015), and posted our preregistration on the OSF repository of the article.

We posted 500 Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) worth 40 cents on MTurk. We obtained data from 503 respondents and excluded data from 21 participants who reported seeing a minimum price that was strictly higher than the true median price ($320), leaving a final sample size of 482. We did not record any demographic or psychographic variables.

Participants imagined that they often travel for work to Florida and Colorado and that they have subscribed to daily notifications from a travel agent indicating the best prices currently available for round-trip flights to Colorado and to Florida. Participants first reviewed the 26 price notifications they had received in the past month, thus observing 26 prices for flights to both destinations (as each notification displayed both prices side by side). This presentation format was meant to imitate “push notifications” that websites send to consumers (e.g., “SkyScanner,” “Kayak,” or “AirfareWatchDog”). Participants took as much time as they wanted to review each notification before dismissing it, after which a new notification appeared.

We manipulated the dispersion of flight prices that appeared on the notifications. Prices in one “common category” were the same for all participants (with prices ranging between $240 and $400; SD = 96) or the other “manipulated” category had either greater dispersion (with prices ranging between $140 and $500; SD = 96) or the same amount of dispersion as the common category. We instructed participants to pay close attention to the prices because they would have to book a flight later. As in previous studies, we counterbalanced the labels (i.e., destinations) across categories and did not find any significant effect of this counterbalancing factor.

After reviewing all 26 notifications, participants learned about an unexpected business trip to Florida (or Colorado, depending on which destination was the common category) 7 days from now. We told participants that they had received a travel allowance of $500 to book a flight with their usual travel agent, and that any money remaining
from this allowance could be used to enjoy meals and drinks at their destination. To make decisions incentive-compatible, participants earned a bonus of 10 cents for every $50 they had left after booking the flight. On each of the 6 “days” before the trip, participants received an offer from the travel agent, and participants decided between booking the flight at the offered price or deferring until the next day in the hope that a cheaper price will be offered. If participants deferred booking a flight until the day before departure, they had to book the flight at the price offered on this last day. We further clarified that the tickets are nonrefundable, that the prices offered by the travel agent would be comparable to those they had seen so far, and that the prices would not become systematically cheaper or more expensive over time.

Unbeknownst to participants, the sequence of prices offered by the travel agent was determined in advance: the agent would first offer a price of $340, then a price of $320, then $260, $380, $300, and finally a price of $320 on the day before departure. Given the prices presented in the learning phase for the common-category destination, accepting the price of $260 offered on the third day is a clear dominant option: the expected value of rejecting this offer is negative (Cox and Oaxaca 1989), and there was only an 11% chance of receiving a cheaper price across the remaining 3 days. After participants purchased a flight, we finally asked them to report the minimum price they remembered seeing in the common category, and to estimate the average price of flights to this destination (which was perceived as equal across conditions, as expected).

Results. The actual cheapest flight in the common category was $240. Among participants in the “equal dispersion” condition, only 8% reported a minimum price lower than this value. In contrast, 43% of participants in the “higher dispersion” condition did so. Following our preregistration, we analyzed the reported minimum value using an OLS regression including as predictors a dummy for the experimental condition (equal vs. high dispersion in the manipulated category), a contrast for the counterbalancing factor (Colorado vs. Florida), and the interaction of these variables. As predicted, only the experimental condition had a significant effect ($t(481) = -6.84, p < .001$, standardized $b = -.60$). Consistent with the dispersion spillover we observed in studies 1A–1C, the minimum price reported by participants was on average $24.85 lower when price dispersion in the manipulated category was higher than in the common category.

In turn, we find that the amount of price dispersion in the manipulated category had an influence on participants’ search behavior. Only 8% of participants in the “equal dispersion” condition continued searching after seeing the third offer of $260. In contrast, 21% of participants in the “more dispersion” condition continued searching beyond this utility-maximizing offer. Following our preregistration, we analyzed the duration of search using an ordered logistic model. This model represents search depth in a latent utility space divided in five thresholds (delineating the preference between accepting the price offered on day D vs. D + 1) and estimates the impact of our predictors (a dummy coding the experimental condition, a contrast for the counterbalancing factor, and the interaction of those terms) in this latent utility space. As predicted, the subjective utility of search was significantly higher when dispersion in the manipulated category was high ($b = .47; t(481) = 2.41, p = .016$, odds ratio = 1.60).

In sum, study 2 demonstrates that dispersion spillover can lead consumers to forego attractive purchase opportunities, even in circumstances in which they are incentivized to make accurate decisions. In another study (reported as study A2 in the web appendix), we observe a similar impact on judgments of price attractiveness. Based on Janiszewski and Lichtenstein (1999), we predicted and found that people judge the same flight prices as less attractive when they have learned another distribution of prices with a higher (vs. equal) amount of price dispersion.

Study 3: Search for Higher Compensation

Study 3 examines how dispersion spillover influences the decisions of people working on HITs on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. Many people today supplement their income by performing tasks in exchange for compensation. They may drive for Uber, deliver food for Deliveroo, or complete freelance missions on Upwork or Fiverr. In this “gig economy,” consumers frequently decide between accepting a current task for a given compensation (e.g., driving a passenger to the airport for $60) or rejecting it, hoping that a more attractive task will be offered (McCall 1972; Mortensen 1970).

We asked MTurk workers to review a list of remunerations that we have paid in the past for different types of HITs. We then offered them a remuneration for the present study that they could either accept, or reject in hope that a larger compensation would be offered later. Given our previous results, we predicted that a dispersion spillover between types of HITs will lead MTurk workers to overestimate the availability of large remunerations, to be more likely to forego attractive offers, and to earn less money as a result.

Method. We preregistered this study on AsPredicted (Simonsohn et al. 2015) and made the preregistration available on the OSF repository. Following our preregistration, we posted 500 HITs worth 20 cents on MTurk. We obtained data from 502 respondents and excluded data from 12 workers who reported seeing a maximum bonus that was strictly lower than the true median bonus (32
cents), leaving a final sample size of 490.\footnote{Forty-eight participants entered a bonus amount that was smaller than 1. We assume that those participants entered the bonus amount in dollars rather than in cents (e.g., a value of 0.42 for a bonus of 42 cents) and recoded their responses accordingly. Excluding those participants instead leaves our key result unchanged ($P = .003$).} We did not record any demographic or psychographic variables.

We told the MTurk workers that we often give bonus payments to participants in our studies and that the bonuses that we award depends on the type of study. We then presented participants with a sequence of 50 “bonuses that we have paid in the past.” Half of the bonuses were for “Red HITs” and the other half for “Blue HITs.” We presented each bonus for 1.2 seconds. To facilitate learning, we color-coded the bonuses and paired “Red HITs” with a circle and “Blue HITs” with a 12-pointed star.

Red and blue HITs had the same average bonus (32 cents), but we manipulated the dispersion of bonuses between participants. The common category had the same amount of dispersion across conditions (with bonuses ranging between 24 and 40 cents; SD = 4). The manipulated category either had the same amount of dispersion as the common category or a higher amount of dispersion (with bonuses ranging between 14 and 50 cents; SD = 9.6). As in previous studies, we counterbalanced the labels (i.e., color of HIT) across distributions and did not observe any significant effect of this counterbalancing factor.

After this learning phase, we revealed to workers the type of HIT for which they were recruited (i.e., red or blue HIT, whichever was the common category). We informed the MTurk workers that they would now have an opportunity to earn a bonus and presented them with five closed boxes, numbered from 1 to 5. We explained that each box contained a possible bonus payment, drawn from the distribution of bonuses of the HIT type they were currently working on. The bonus in each box was identical for all workers: 30 cents in box 1, 38 cents in box 2, 26 cents in box 3, 20 cents in box 4, and 32 cents in box 5. After opening each box, workers could either decide to keep the bonus in the box, in which case the task would end and they would receive this bonus, or decide to discard the bonus and open another box. If they opened all five, they would receive the bonus in the final box. At the end of the study, we finally asked MTurk workers to report the highest bonus they remembered seeing in the common category.

Results. Workers’ beliefs about the largest bonus they could earn was influenced by the dispersion of prices in the manipulated category. When prices in the manipulated category were more-dispersed, 52% of workers reported a maximum bonus payment for the common category that was higher than the actual maximum of 40 cents (vs. 14% when prices in the manipulated category were equally dispersed). Following our preregistration, we analyzed the reported maximum value using an OLS regression including as predictors a dummy for the experimental condition (higher vs. equal dispersion in the manipulated category), a contrast for the counterbalancing factor (red vs. blue HITs), and the interaction between these variables. As predicted, only the experimental condition had an impact. Workers reported seeing a maximum bonus that was on average 3.69 cents higher when dispersion in the manipulated category was higher than in the manipulated category ($t(486) = 8.10, p < .001, standardized b = .28$).

We also find an effect on workers’ decisions to accept bonuses. Given the bonuses presented in the learning phase, the bonus of 38 cents in box 2 was very attractive: the probability of finding a larger bonus in one of the next three boxes was only 11%, and the expected value of continued search was negative. When dispersion in the manipulated category was the same as in the common category, 61% of workers accepted the bonus payment in the second box. In contrast, when dispersion in the manipulated category was higher, only 39% of workers accepted the bonus payment in the second box. More workers continued their search, ultimately receiving one of the (smaller) bonus payments contained in the following boxes. Following our preregistration, we analyzed the number of boxes opened using an ordered logistic model, as in the previous study. As predicted, the subjective utility of search was significantly higher when dispersion in the manipulated category was higher ($b = .52; t(486) = 2.99, p = .002, odds ratio = 1.68$), which led workers to earn a smaller bonus ($t(486) = -1.42, p < .001, standardized b = -.39$).

In sum, study 3 demonstrates that dispersion spillover can lead workers to make suboptimal decisions in the gig economy. Here, it led MTurk workers to earn less money for their work.

Study 4: Bidding in an Auction

Study 4 examines how dispersion spillover influences bidding behavior in auctions. In a typical “blind” auction (also called first-price sealed auction), the optimal strategy is to place a bid that is slightly higher than what you believe the highest bid among competing bidders will be (if this price is below your willingness to pay). Accurate beliefs about the distribution of bids are therefore essential to avoid overpaying (Dholakia and Simonson 2005; McAfee and McMillan 1987). Given our previous results, we predicted that dispersion spillover will lead bidders to overestimate the maximum bid that other people would place and consequently place a higher bid themselves.

Method. We preregistered this hypothesis on AsPredicted (Simonsohn et al. 2015) and posted it on the OSF repository of the article. We posted 500 HITs worth 30 cents on MTurk and obtained data from 502 respondents. We excluded data from 226 participants who reported seeing a maximum bid that was strictly lower than the true
median bid ($32) or made at least one mistake in a quiz that tested their understanding of the bidding procedure. This left us with a final sample size of 276.5

We first explained the rules of the auction to bidders as follows: an item is shown to the crowd, and all the attendants privately submit a bid. After all bids are submitted, we review the bids, and the highest bidder gets to buy the item at the price he or she entered. We then explained that we had auctioned two items so far, a $100 Amazon gift card and a $100 Whole Foods gift card, and that 26 bids were placed on each item.

Bidders reviewed the 26 bids for the Amazon gift card and the 26 bids for the Whole Foods gift card, one at a time, in two distinct blocks, as in study1B. Each bid appeared on screen for exactly 1 second. To facilitate learning, the bids for the Amazon gift card were displayed in orange with an icon of a shopping cart, and the bids for the Whole Foods gift card were displayed in green with an icon of a basket. We manipulated, between participants, the dispersion of the bids for the Whole Foods gift card such that they were more dispersed (bids between $14 and $50, SD = 8.6) or less dispersed (bid between $30 and $34, SD = 1.1) than the bids for the Amazon gift card (bids between $27 and $37, SD = 2.4). The median bid for both items was always $32.

After bidders reviewed the bids for the two types of gift cards, we informed them that we had another $100 Amazon gift card to auction. We explained that 25 other people had already submitted their bids and that these bids should be similar to the ones they saw earlier for the other Amazon gift card. We then endowed each bidder with $60 and allowed them to bid any amount from this money to try to win the Amazon gift card. We informed them that one participant would be randomly selected and that their choice will be enacted for real.

After bidders submitted their bid (e.g., $40), we reminded them of the rules of the auction. If their bid is higher than all other 25 bids, they would pocket the $100 Amazon gift card, plus any leftover money (e.g., $60 — $40 = $20). Conversely, if any of the 25 bids is higher than their own, they would simply pocket the $60. After reading those instructions, they could validate their bid, or go back and change it. Finally, we asked bidders to report the highest bid (apart from theirs) they saw for the Amazon gift card, and we tested their understanding of the bidding procedure.

Results. We find that the dispersion of bids for the Whole Foods gift card had an impact on people’s memory for the maximum bid submitted for the Amazon gift card. When bids for the Whole Foods gift card had a larger amount of dispersion, 27% of participants (vs. 3% when the Whole Foods gift card had a smaller amount of dispersion) reported a maximum bid that was above the true maximum bid of $37. As predicted, we find that bidders reported seeing a maximum bid for the Amazon gift card that was on average $1.84 higher when prices for the Whole Foods gift card were more dispersed ($t(274) = 5.46, p < .001, standardized b = .63). This belief was reflected in the bids that they submitted: The average bid was $2.60 higher when prices for the whole Foods gift card were more dispersed ($t(274) = 2.46, p = .014, standardized b = .30).

In sum, study 4 demonstrates that dispersion spillover can lead consumers to form inaccurate beliefs about how much money other people would bid, and in turn lead them to bid excessively in auctions. We also present in the web appendix an exact replication of this study (study A3) with students enrolled at the University of Colorado Boulder and at the Rotterdam School of Management.

PART 3: MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS

In the conceptual background, we described two cognitive mechanisms that might underlie judgments of dispersion: a mechanism based on exemplars, which involves the storage and retrieval of concrete, previously observed prices, and a mechanism based on prototypes, or intuitive statistics, which involves the formation and application of abstract summary representations.

Two results so far suggest that judgments of dispersion are at least partly based on exemplars stored in memory. First, for two product categories with similar price distributions, most participants provided accurate judgments about the minimum and maximum price in each category. Such high level of accuracy hints at concrete memory traces for previously seen prices. Second, the dispersion spillover is asymmetric: Wider distributions led participants to overestimate the dispersion of tighter distributions, but tighter distributions did not lead participants to underestimate the dispersion of wider distributions. This asymmetry also seems consistent with the presence of concrete memory traces. More extreme memory traces of the high-variance category may lead people to falsely remember seeing similarly extreme prices in the low-variance category. However, it is unclear why less extreme memory traces of the low-variance distribution would lead people to discard the more extreme prices of the high-variance distribution.

We designed studies 5 and 6 to test whether the dispersion spillover is uniquely based on exemplar memory, or if it is also driven by the formation of “intuitive statistics.”

Study 5: Manipulating Averages

As in studies 1A–1C, participants in study 5 saw prices in a common category and a manipulated category.
However, instead of manipulating price dispersion, we manipulated the average price of the manipulated category to be lower, equal, or greater than that of the common category. If dispersion spillover is uniquely driven by exemplar memory, we should observe two results. First, when the means of the categories are different (rather than equal), participants should provide higher judgments of price dispersion for both categories. For example, suppose white wines are priced between $16 and $34 and red wines between $26 and $44. When asked about prices for white wines, activating the memory of a $38 red wine would inflate judgments of dispersion. Second, we may observe a spillover of means between the two categories. Using the previous example again, activating the memory of a $38 red wine would inflate participants’ judgments of central tendency for the white wine category.

**Method.** We paid 150 respondents from MTurk 60 cents for their participation. Due to a technical glitch, we were unable to record data from one respondent, leaving a final sample size of 149. We did not record any demographic or psychographic variables. The learning phase was identical to study 1A, except that we held price dispersion constant across the common and the manipulated categories (SD = 4.5) and instead varied the average price in the manipulated category between participants. The common category had a mean price of $25, and the manipulated category had a mean price of $15, $25, or $35. In the test phase, participants entered the 25 prices that they remembered seeing for each of the two categories on two separate distribution builders.

**Results.** The left panel of figure 3 shows that participants reported a similar price range for both categories, regardless of whether the two categories had the same mean (middle bar) or different means (other two bars). A mixed linear model with category type (common vs. manipulated) as a within-participant factor, the actual mean of the manipulated category (low vs. medium vs. high) as a between-participant factor, and the interaction between these two factors reveals that participants created distributions with comparable ranges across conditions, both for the manipulated category ($M_{high} = 18.38$ vs. $M_{med} = 17.55$ vs. $M_{low} = 17.00$, $p > .332$ for all pairwise differences) and for the common category ($M_{high} = 16.54$ vs. $M_{med} = 16.00$ vs. $M_{low} = 16.67$, $p > .304$ for all pairwise differences).

The right panel of figure 3 shows consistent evidence. For the manipulated category, participants appropriately created distributions with higher means if the actual mean price in the manipulated category was high versus medium ($M_{high} = 33.36$ vs. $M_{med} = 24.73$: $z = 11.90$, $p < .001$, $z = 11.90$, $p < .001$).
standardized $b = 1.40$), and medium versus low ($M_{\text{med}} = 24.73 \text{ vs. } M_{\text{low}} = 16.27; z = 11.44, p < .001$, standardized $b = 1.38$). For the common category, participants appropriately created distributions with means that were not statistically significantly different from each other ($M_{\text{high}} = 25.95 \text{ vs. } M_{\text{med}} = 25.54 \text{ vs. } M_{\text{low}} = 24.86, p = .134$ for largest pairwise differences). We note that this absence of mean spillover is consistent with past research documenting people’s ability to provide category-specific judgments of averages (Chong and Treisman 2005; Malmi and Samson 1983).

From these results, we conclude that dispersion spillover is unlikely to be uniquely driven by the inappropriate activation of prices from the other category. Indeed, presenting two categories with different (vs. identical) average prices did not lead participants to report more price dispersion in each category and did not change people’s judgments of the average price in each category.

Study 6: Phantom Prices

We designed study 6 to provide direct evidence that dispersion spillover is driven in part by the formation of “intuitive statistics” of dispersion. Participants learned about two categories with non-overlapping price distributions, such that the maximum price in one category was always lower than the minimum price in the other category. In line with previous studies, we expect participants to report a wider price range in one category when the other category has a larger amount of dispersion. Since the price distributions do not overlap, this dispersion spillover would mean that participants report prices that were never encountered in any of the categories, which we call phantom prices.

We further distinguish between two types of phantom prices, those that lie in between the two distributions (interior phantom prices), and those that lie outside the range of prices presented across both distributions (exterior phantom prices, see figure 4 for an illustration). Reporting more interior phantom prices after seeing a higher amount of dispersion in another category is inconsistent with a simple confusion of prices across categories (i.e., remembering a white wine price as a red wine price, or vice-versa). However, it may still be accounted for by an exemplar-based model of judgment. Suppose prices of white wines range from $8 to $16, and prices of red wines are higher than that. An interior phantom price for white wines (e.g., $22) could result from the weighted activation of a red wine price (e.g., $28) in combination with a white wine price (e.g., $16 \times .5 + $28 \times .5 = $22). If the distribution of red wines is more dispersed (e.g., starting at $28 rather than $33), the greater proximity (i.e., similarity; Casasanto 2008; Rips 1989) between the prices of red wines and white wines may facilitate the activation of red wines and increase the number of interior phantom prices that participants report.

On the other hand, reporting more exterior phantom prices after seeing a higher amount of dispersion in another category would be more difficult to explain with exemplar-based models of judgment alone. Following our previous example, a white wine priced at $4 cannot be described as a linear combination of prices observed across the two wine categories. It involves extrapolation beyond the range of previously seen prices and suggests that judgments of price dispersion are based in part on “intuitive statistics” of dispersion.

Another feature of the design warrants attention. In previous studies, we manipulated the properties of one category between participants (the “manipulated” category) and held the other constant (the “common category”). In study 6, we orthogonally manipulated the price dispersion of both categories between participants, such that the price dispersion of red wines can be low versus high, and the price dispersion of white wines can be low versus high. We will therefore analyze the extent to which people’s judgments of price dispersion for a focal category (e.g., white wines) are influenced by the actual price dispersion of this focal category (white wines) and by the actual price dispersion of the other category (red wines).

Method. We paid 304 respondents from MTurk 60 cents for their participation. We did not record any demographic or psychographic variables. Data from three participants were not recorded because of a technical glitch, so the final sample size for analysis was 301. All participants saw 26 prices for red wines and 26 prices for white wines, in random order. The mean price of red wines and white wines was the same for all participants ($M_{\text{red}} = $38 vs. $M_{\text{white}} = $12), and we orthogonally manipulated the standard deviations of the two price distributions to be low (SD = 1.75) or high (SD = 5.26). The learning phase was otherwise identical to that of study 5. In the test phase, we asked participants to construct two distributions of prices on two separate distribution builders: one for the prices of red wines and one for the prices of white wines.

Results. We first examined how participants’ judgments of price dispersion were shaped by the actual price dispersion displayed in each of the two categories. To do so, we regressed the price range of each reported distribution7 (i.e., white wines and red wines) on a contrast variable indicating whether the true price dispersion of this focal category was high (vs. low), a contrast variable indicating whether the true price dispersion of the other

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6 We present multiple results showing that the non-significant results reported in this section are more consistent with the null hypothesis than with other alternatives.

7 We report consistent effects across other statistics of dispersion (minimum, maximum, SD, variance) in the web appendix.
category was high (vs. low), the two-way interaction of these variables, and a random intercept for each participant. This analysis first reveals a significant effect of the true price dispersion of the focal category: The price range reported for a category (e.g., white wines) was $6.69 wider when the actual price dispersion of this focal category (e.g., white wines) was large ($z = 9.46, p < .001, standardized \( b = 0.71 \)). Replicating the dispersion spillover, we also find a significant effect of the actual price dispersion of the other category: The price range reported for a category (e.g., white wines) was $2.58 larger when the actual price dispersion of the other category (e.g., red wines) was large ($z = 3.65, p < .001, standardized \( b = 0.27 \)). The interaction effect between those two variables was not significant ($p > .22$).

Next, we regressed the number of phantom prices participants reported in each of the two distributions using the same predictors. If phantom prices were uniquely driven by inattention or random responses, we should observe that participants reported a similar number of them in a focal category regardless of whether the other category had low dispersion or high dispersion. Instead, we observe an average of 2.96 phantom values in a category (e.g., white wines) when the other category (e.g., red wines) had low price dispersion, and an average of 4.08 phantom values when the other category had high price dispersion ($z = 4.345, p < .001, standardized \( b = .48 \))

As mentioned earlier, a stronger test of the influence of intuitive statistics of dispersion only considers the “exterior” phantom prices (i.e., values that were strictly lower or higher than all the prices presented across both distributions). We found that people reported a larger number “exterior” phantom prices in a category when the other category had high rather than low price dispersion (0.85 vs. 0.59; $z = 2.183, p = .029, standardized \( b = .25 \))

In sum, study 6 shows the dispersion spillover when two distributions do not overlap. This result is inconsistent with a simple confusion of prices across categories. In addition, we find that participants reported more exterior phantom prices when the price dispersion of the other category was
higher. This suggests that consumers’ judgments of price dispersion are not only based on exemplar memories, but they are also informed by intuitive statistics of dispersion that are not independent across categories.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

**Summary of Findings**

Eight experiments examined consumers’ ability to make accurate judgments of price dispersion across multiple product categories. When consumers learned about multiple categories that shared the same amount of price dispersion, we found that people were able to make relatively accurate judgments. However, when one category had a larger amount of price dispersion than the other, we consistently observed that consumers overestimate the amount of price dispersion that was present in the low-dispersion category. We observed this dispersion spillover regardless of whether prices were presented individually (e.g., study 1A) or in pairs (e.g., study 2), when product categories were presented simultaneously (e.g., study 1C) or sequentially (e.g., study 1B), when price distributions overlapped completely (e.g., study 3), partially (e.g., study 4), or not at all (e.g., study 6), and across a variety of products (wines, pillows, blankets, flights, gift cards, bonus amounts). Across studies, we used various elicitation methods to demonstrate dispersion spillover, by asking participants to report the maximum and minimum price they saw (e.g., study 1A), asking participants to report their beliefs about the entire distribution on a distribution builder (e.g., study 1B), or by asking them to make dispersion-related judgments and decisions (e.g., study 2).

We have shown that this difficulty to form category-specific impressions of price dispersion has significant downstream consequences in multiple contexts. In a series of preregistered, incentive-compatible experiments, we have shown that it affects consumers’ willingness to search for (and likelihood to find) better prices and compensation offers and that it can lead people to overbid for a desirable good in an auction.

Finally, we disentangled two cognitive mechanism that may underlie dispersion spillover. A first explanation, grounded in exemplar-based models of judgment, involved the weighted activation of prices across categories. A second explanation, derived from prototype-based models of judgment, involved the formation of “intuitive statistics” of dispersion that are insufficiently category specific. Our experiments suggest that the first account is not a sufficient explanation of the dispersion spillover. For instance, we did not find that people provide higher judgments of price dispersion in a category when it was learned alongside another category with higher or lower average prices. In contrast, other patterns are consistent with the hypothesis that “intuitive statistics” play a role in consumers’ judgments of price dispersion. For instance, we found that people report “phantom prices” that are strictly lower or higher than any of the prices seen across all categories.

**Implications for Theory**

Together, our findings shed lights on two understudied aspects of the literature (Mazumdar et al. 2005, 92): The category specificity of price knowledge, and the mental representations that underlie price judgments. In particular, our data suggest that consumers do not only mentally represent the price distributions in their environment using “intuitive averages,” but also with “intuitive variances” that encode the dispersion of prices that they encountered. In combination, these two intuitive statistics could allow consumers to efficiently summarize any normally distributed price category (Flannagan, Fried, and Holyoak 1986), without maintaining memory traces for the prices that they have encountered. However, it remains an open question why these abstract summary representations are more category specific for central tendency than for dispersion. Indeed, multiple studies have documented people’s ability to accurately estimate the means of multiple distributions presented concurrently (Levin 1974, 1975; Malmi and Samson 1983).

One possibility is that the dispersion spillover reflects an adaptive feature of cognition (Gigerenzer and Murray 2015; Gigerenzer and Selten 2002). Statistically, the variance of a sample is a noisy and imperfect estimator of the population variance: If related categories are expected to have a similar amount of dispersion, pooling dispersion information across multiple categories may be an adaptive strategy to increase precision. This adaptation is consistent with using a pooled error term in tests of statistical inference, and more generally with the statistical assumption that the variance from one group contains information about the variance of the other (Keppel and Wickens 1975). The fact that the dispersion spillover is stronger when the two categories are more similar (see study A4 in the web appendix) is consistent with this proposition.

Another possibility is that tracking the dispersions of multiple distributions is simply more difficult than tracking the averages of multiple distributions. Variance is defined as the average squared deviation from the mean. While computing the variance requires knowledge about the mean, computing the mean does not require knowledge about the variance. While shortcuts exist to estimate variance that do not require the mean as an input (e.g., keeping track of the range of prices; Hozo, Djulbegovic, and Hozo 2005), our results suggest that people do not naturally use them.

In any case, it appears that the difference between central tendency and dispersion goes beyond statistical complexity. Just like central tendency is the “first statistical moment” and dispersion the “second statistical moment,”
central tendency may be the “first intuitive statistic” and dispersion the “second intuitive statistic.” This observation has interesting implications for models of consumer learning. For instance, Erdem and Keane’s dynamic learning model (1996) assumes that consumers’ beliefs about the quality of a brand are not influenced by other brands also present in the learning environment. Our data suggest that this assumption might be correct when it comes to the perceived average quality of the brand, but that the perceived variability of a brand’s quality would be influenced by the variability in the quality of other brands in the learning environment.

Implications for Practice

The existence of a dispersion spillover calls for caution in the design of shelf spaces and online stores: When a low-variance product category (e.g., white wines) is presented in the same environment as a high-variance product category (e.g., red wines), consumers may form distorted expectations about the likelihood of finding cheap prices in the low-variance category, which may translate into a lower propensity to make a purchase from that category. In addition, our findings suggest that consumers’ search strategies might benefit from decision aids, particularly when shopping for expensive items. Over the recent years, a growing number of online shops (e.g., Google Flights, CarGurus) have started displaying visual cues signaling whether the current offer (e.g., a flight to Colorado priced at $200, a 2020 used Subaru priced at $18,000) is much cheaper, cheaper, on par, more expensive, or much more expensive than other comparable offers. Given the dispersion spillover that we have documented, we believe that this information can be highly valuable to consumers, who might otherwise misjudge the availability of cheaper offers, and potentially miss out on objectively attractive offers. Such decision aids can also be profit-enhancing for stores and dealerships: By recalibrating consumers’ expectations with the reality of the prices that exist in the category, they would reduce friction and search length, and make quicker deals.

Finally, we believe that distribution builders are powerful tools, and that they can be useful to study the beliefs that consumers possess about various marketplace phenomena. To encourage the use of distribution builders in behavioral research and marketing practice, we have developed distBuilder, an open-source JavaScript library that allows adding distribution builders to online surveys with minimal programming knowledge and effort. A link to the source code and documentation for this library is available at the following address: https://quentinandre.github.io/DistributionBuilder/.

Future Research Directions

We hope our article may stimulate marketing researchers to further examine how consumers form impressions of dispersion. We offer multiple suggestions. First, our studies examined dispersion spillover for the same attribute (price) across different product categories. However, it is possible that dispersion spillover also happens for different attributes (e.g., prices and battery life) in the same category. This result, if observed, would significantly hamper consumers’ ability to make trade-offs between attributes when buying products. It would also suggest that dispersion spillover is a consequence of relatively automatic information processing.

Second, future studies may investigate moderators of the dispersion spillover. In a study (reported as study A4 in the web appendix), we found a stronger dispersion spillover between similar categories (red and white wines) than between dissimilar categories (red wines and smartphone cases). Future articles could probe the role of other contextual (e.g., the temporal distance between learning and judgments) or individual-level moderators (e.g., numeracy) of dispersion spillover.

Third, our studies always included a learning phase and a test phase, but it is not clear if the learning phase is necessary for dispersion spillover to emerge. This depends on whether the spillover happens at the time of encoding, judgment, or both. It is conceivable that people’s impressions of dispersion for a given category depend on the amount of dispersion in another category that is activated at the time of judgment, even if they were not encoded at the same time. This could give rise to interesting framing effects. For instance, consumers might ascribe more price dispersion to Gucci handbags when they are evaluated in the context of “luxury goods” (i.e., a more dispersed category) versus “luxury handbags” (a less dispersed category).

Finally, our studies have examined participants’ ability to form category-specific representations of price dispersion and documented a dispersion spillover. Future studies could explore the presence of a similar spillover in judgments of covariation (between price and quality for instance). Based on the results of this manuscript, we expect that consumers would also have difficulty forming category-specific impressions of correlation/covariation, and that the strength of association between two variables in one category would be influenced by the correlation of the same two variables in another category.

DATA COLLECTION INFORMATION

Data for all studies were collected by the first author on the following dates:

8 All day and times are expressed in UTC.
• Study 1A was started on March 13, 2019, at 20:45 PM and ended on March 14, 2019, at 01:01 AM.
• Study 1B was started on August 05, 2019, at 22:16 PM and ended on August 06, 2019, at 01:07 AM.
• Study 1C was started on February 07, 2020, at 16:59 PM and ended on February 07, 2020, at 18:58 PM.
• Study 2 was preregistered on February 15, 2020, at 16:31 PM, started on February 15, 2020, at 16:52 PM, and ended on February 16, 2020, at 02:07 AM.
• Study 3 was preregistered on July 16, 2019, at 19:05 PM, started on July 16, 2019, at 19:47 PM, and ended on July 17, 2019, at 01:29 AM.
• Study 4 was preregistered on March 27, 2020, at 13:28 PM. Data collection for the online sample was started on March 27, 2020, at 14:37 PM and ended on March 29, 2020, at 07:44 AM. Data collection for the lab samples was started on April 08, 2020, at 13:04 PM and ended on April 28, 2020, at 08:06 AM.
• Study 5 was started on February 22, 2017, at 17:47 PM and ended on February 22, 2017, at 20:43 PM.
• Study 6 was started on August 07, 2017, at 21:55 PM and ended on August 08, 2017, at 01:21 AM.

The first author is responsible for all the statistical analysis and graphs reported in this manuscript and in the web appendix. The experimental materials, raw data, codebooks, data transformation scripts, and data analysis scripts for all studies have been posted on the OSF repository.

REFERENCES


Web Appendix

Can Consumers Learn Price Dispersion?
Evidence for Dispersion Spillover Across Categories

QUENTIN ANDRÉ
NICHOLAS REINHOLTZ
BART DE LANGHE
Web Appendix A - Supplementary Studies

This appendix presents all the supplementary studies mentioned in the paper. It is also available (in a nicer, more readable format) on the OSF repository of the paper: https://osf.io/hvxje/.

STUDY A1: ARE PERCEPTIONS OF DISPERSION ONLY DRIVEN BY THE RANGE?

Design

Participants saw two distributions:

- Focal: Normal Distribution SD, \( \sigma = 3.1 \)
- Manipulated: Normal Distribution, \( \sigma = 3.1 \) or Uniform, \( \sigma = 4.6 \).

The range was always equal across conditions. See design below:
Analysis

Descriptive statistics

Number of participants:

395

Characteristics of reported distributions

For each distribution reported by participants, we computed the following statistics of interest:

- Mean
- SD
- Variance
- Interquartile Range (IQR)
- Minimum
- Maximum
- Kurtosis

We regressed those statistics on the following predictors:

- One factor indicating the type of the distribution (Dummy-coded: "Manipulated vs. Common")
- One factor indicating the amount of dispersion in the "Manipulated" distribution (Dummy-coded: "Uniform" vs. Normal")
- The interaction of those factors
- A random intercept for each participant

The conditional effects for each of the two categories (manipulated vs. common) are presented in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Var</th>
<th>IQR</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Exposure to another distribution with more weight on the tail inflated people's perception of dispersion, and this effect is driven by a lower kurtosis: People put more weight on the tails of the distributions after learning a uniform (vs. normal) distribution.

Those two results confirm that people's perception of dispersion are sensitive to the overall dispersion of the distribution, and not simply to its range.

**STUDY A2: DISPERSION SPILLOVER AFFECTS JUDGMENTS OF PRICE ATTRACTIVENESS**

**Characteristics and distributions**

We present participants with prices for two different types of flights:
• Flights to Colorado
• Flights to Florida

As in previous studies, we show 25 flights of each type, presented in a random order, for 1.2 seconds each.

We manipulate between-subjects the variance of the distributions:

• For half of the participants, the two types of flights have the same, small amount of price variance.
• For the other half, one type of flights has a large amount of price variance and the other has a small amount of price variance.

When the two distributions do not have the same amount of price variance, we counterbalance the "high price variance" distribution to be assigned to the "Colorado" or "Florida" flights.

Dependent Variables and Analysis

After they learn the distribution of prices, we instruct participants to focus on the prices of one type of flight (e.g. "flights to Florida") and to ignore the others (e.g. "flights to Colorado").
• If the participant saw two distributions with an equal amount of price variance, the distribution to ignore is chosen at random.
• If the participant saw two distributions with a different amount of price variance, the distribution to ignore is the one that had a large amount of price variance.

As such, regardless of the experimental condition they were assigned to, all the participants have to answer questions about a distribution that had a small amount of price variance. Normatively, the responses that they give should not differ between conditions: any significant deviation would be explained by an extraneous influence of the other distribution that they concurrently learned.

**Perception of the minimum value**

We first ask participants to report the minimum value that they saw.

---

**OLS Regression Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep. Variable: Reported Min. Price</th>
<th>R-squared: 0.145</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model: OLS</td>
<td>Adj. R-squared: 0.142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Method: Least Squares  
F-statistic: 50.81

Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2021  
Prob (F-statistic): 7.66e-12

Time: 17:27:57  
Log-Likelihood: -1593.4

No. Observations: 301  
AIC: 3191.

Df Residuals: 299  
BIC: 3198.

Df Model: 1

Covariance Type: nonrobust

|            | coef   | std err | t     | P>|t|  | [0.025 | 0.975|
|------------|--------|---------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| Intercept  | 250.380| 3.946   | 63.445| 0.000| 242.614| 258.146|
| Higher dispersion | -39.7177 | 5.572 | -7.128 | 0.000 | -50.683 | -28.753 |

Omnibus: 36.845  
Durbin-Watson: 1.800

Prob(Omnibus): 0.000  
Jarque-Bera (JB): 234.581

Skew: 0.092  
Prob(JB): 1.15e-51

Kurtosis: 7.321  
Cond. No. 2.62

Standardized betas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher dispersion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proportion of responses below true min

Looking at the CDF of responses, we find a very different pattern between conditions:
• In the "Equal dispersion" condition, the likelihood of reporting a price below the true minimum price ($240) is extremely low.
• In the "Higher dispersion" condition, this likelihood is significantly higher, and only drops at the true minimum price of the other distribution.

Proportion below actual min: 10% vs. 58%: $X(1) = 77.92, p < .001$

Likelihood to accept offers

After asking this question, we investigate the downstream consequences of those perceptions on consumers' likelihood to search for a better price. We asked respondents to imagine seeing a flight costing $280, and to indicate their likelihood to accept this price on a scale from -3 (definitely search for a better price) to +3 (definitely accept the deal).

We repeated this question for four other prices: $260, 240 (the true minimum price), 220 and 200.
This reveals a significant impact of the variance of the other distribution: across the board, participants are more likely to accept the offer when they concurrently learned another distribution that had more extreme prices.

Model:        MixedLM       Dependent Variable:  Likelihood to Accept

No. Observations:     1505               Method:   REML
No. Groups:          301                 Scale:   1.1738
Min. group size:      5                  Log-Likelihood:  -2575.6218
Max. group size:      5                  Converged:  Yes
Mean group size:      5.0

|                        | Coef. | Std.Err. | z     | P>|z| | [0.025 | 0.975 |
|------------------------|-------|----------|-------|------|--------|--------|
| Intercept              | 1.876 | 0.114    | 16.485| 0.000| 1.653  | 2.099 |
| Condition: More variance (dummy-coded) | -0.912 | 0.161    | -5.675| 0.000| -1.227 | -0.597|

Participants Random Effect 1.708 0.164

Standardized betas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition: More variance (dummy-coded)</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants Random Effect</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We also notice an interaction effect, consistent with participants' perception of the minimum price:

- In the "As much variance" condition, any decrease below the true minimum price has a small effect on participants' willingness to accept the deal (as the majority of people are already certain to accept the deal)
In the "More variance" condition, we do not observe this attenuation (as the offer might not be below the minimum price that they perceive).

Regression table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model: MixedLM</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Likelihood to Accept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. Observations: 1505</td>
<td>Method: REML</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Groups: 301</td>
<td>Scale: 0.6946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. group size: 5</td>
<td>Log-Likelihood: -2267.5572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max. group size: 5</td>
<td>Converged: Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean group size: 5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Coef. | Std.Err. | z | P>|z| | [0.025 0.975] |
|-------|----------|---|-------|----------------|
| Intercept | 0.663 | 0.126 | 5.263 | 0.000 | 0.416 0.910 |
| Condition: Higher dispersion | - | 0.178 | -2.078 | 0.038 | -0.718 -0.021 |
| Discount: -$20 | 0.790 | 0.048 | 16.419 | 0.000 | 0.696 0.884 |
| Condition × Discount | - | 0.068 | -7.047 | 0.000 | -0.612 -0.346 |
| Below Min. Price | 1.263 | 0.346 | 3.653 | 0.000 | 0.585 1.941 |
| Condition × Below Min. Price | - | 0.488 | -3.338 | 0.001 | -2.587 -0.673 |
| Discount × Below Min. Price | - | 0.108 | -5.794 | 0.000 | -0.834 -0.412 |
| Condition × Discount × Below Min. Price | 0.762 | 0.152 | 5.019 | 0.000 | 0.465 1.060 |
| Participants Random Effect | 1.804 | 0.213 | |

Standardized effects:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition: Higher dispersion</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discount: -$20</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition × Discount</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below Min. Price</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition × Below Min. Price</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discount × Below Min. Price</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition × Discount × Below Min. Price</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants Random Effect</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marginal effects of price reductions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>z-score</th>
<th>p-values</th>
<th>Std β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal dispersion, Above min. price</td>
<td>0.790000</td>
<td>0.048116</td>
<td>16.418501</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>0.450243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal dispersion, Below min. price</td>
<td>0.166667</td>
<td>0.096233</td>
<td>1.731909</td>
<td>0.083290</td>
<td>0.094988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal dispersion: Interaction</td>
<td>-0.623333</td>
<td>0.107592</td>
<td>-5.793510</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher dispersion, Above min. price</td>
<td>0.311258</td>
<td>0.047957</td>
<td>6.490381</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>0.177395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher dispersion, Below min. price</td>
<td>0.450331</td>
<td>0.095914</td>
<td>4.695169</td>
<td>0.000003</td>
<td>0.256657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher dispersion: Above vs. Below</td>
<td>0.139073</td>
<td>0.107235</td>
<td>1.296900</td>
<td>0.194665</td>
<td>0.079262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An alternative specification, considering all choices, yields the same conclusion.

Regression Table:
Model: MixedLM  
Dependent Variable: Likelihood to Accept  
No. Observations: 1505  
Method: REML  
No. Groups: 301  
Scale: 0.6950  
Min. group size: 5  
Log-Likelihood: -2268.7101  
Max. group size: 5  
Converged: Yes  
Mean group size: 5.0

| Effect                                    | Coef. | Std.Err. | z     | P>|z| | [0.025 | 0.975 |
|-------------------------------------------|-------|----------|-------|------|--------|--------|
| Intercept                                 | 1.876 | 0.114    | 16.485| 0.000| 1.653  | 2.099  |
| Condition: More variance (dummy-coded)    |       | 0.161    | -5.675| 0.000| -1.227 | -0.597 |
| Price: 260 vs. 280                        | 0.880 | 0.096    | 9.141 | 0.000| 0.691  | 1.069  |
| Price: 240 vs. 260                        | 0.700 | 0.096    | 7.272 | 0.000| 0.511  | 0.889  |
| Price: 220 vs. 240                        | 0.213 | 0.096    | 2.216 | 0.027| 0.025  | 0.402  |
| Condition × Price: 260 vs. 280            | 0.167 | 0.096    | 1.731 | 0.083| -0.022 | 0.355  |
| Condition × Price: 200 vs. 220            |       | 0.136    | -4.282| 0.000| -0.848 | -0.316 |
| Condition × Price: 240 vs. 260            |       | 0.136    | -2.763| 0.006| -0.642 | -0.109 |
| Condition × Price: 220 vs. 240            | 0.144 | 0.136    | 1.062 | 0.288| -0.122 | 0.411  |
| Condition × Price: 200 vs. 220            | 0.284 | 0.136    | 2.087 | 0.037| 0.017  | 0.550  |
| Group Var                                 | 1.804 | 0.213    |       |      |        |        |

Marginal effects of price reductions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>z-score</th>
<th>p-values</th>
<th>Std β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal dispersion: $260 vs. $280</td>
<td>0.880000</td>
<td>0.096265</td>
<td>9.141393</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>0.501537</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Robustness Checks: Consistent participants only

Participants' likelihood to accept the price should be increasing as the prices offered decrease. Is it always the case?

No, 51 participants (out of 301) have at least one linearity violation. Excluding those participants give identical results:

Equal dispersion: $240 vs. $260  0.700000  0.096265  7.271563  0.000000  0.398950
Equal dispersion: $220 vs. $240  0.213333  0.096265  2.216095  0.026685  0.121585
Equal dispersion: $200 vs. $220  0.166667  0.096265  1.731324  0.083394  0.094988
Higher dispersion: $260 vs. $280  0.298013  0.095946  3.106048  0.001896  0.169846
Higher dispersion: $240 vs. $260  0.324503  0.095946  3.382141  0.000719  0.184944
Higher dispersion: $220 vs. $240  0.357616  0.095946  3.727257  0.000194  0.203815
Higher dispersion: $200 vs. $220  0.450331  0.095946  4.693583  0.000003  0.256657

Robustness Checks: Consistent participants only

Participants' likelihood to accept the price should be increasing as the prices offered decrease. Is it always the case?

No, 51 participants (out of 301) have at least one linearity violation. Excluding those participants give identical results:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model: MixedLM</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Likelihood to Accept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. Observations: 1250</td>
<td>Method: REML</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Groups: 250</td>
<td>Scale: 1.1688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. group size: 5</td>
<td>Log-Likelihood: -2133.0043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max. group size: 5</td>
<td>Converged: Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean group size: 5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Coef. | Std.Err. | z   | P>|z| | [0.025 | 0.975 |
|-------|----------|-----|-----|-------|------|
| Intercept | 1.962 | 0.120 | 16.318 | 0.000 | 1.726 | 2.197 |
| Condition: More variance (dummy-coded) | - | 0.174 | -5.561 | 0.000 | -1.305 | -0.625 |
| Participants Random Effect | 1.645 | 0.174 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model: MixedLM</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Likelihood to Accept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. Observations: 1250</td>
<td>Method: REML</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Groups: 250</td>
<td>Scale: 0.5422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. group size: 5</td>
<td>Log-Likelihood: -1756.9418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max. group size: 5</td>
<td>Converged: Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean group size: 5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Coef. | Std.Err. | z   | P&gt;|z| | [0.025 | 0.975 |
|-------|----------|-----|-----|-------|------|
| Intercept | 0.599 | 0.131 | 4.580 | 0.000 | 0.342 | 0.855 |
| Condition: Higher dispersion | - | 0.189 | -2.437 | 0.015 | -0.830 | -0.090 |
| Discount: -$20 | 0.912 | 0.046 | 19.961 | 0.000 | 0.822 | 1.001 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condition × Discount</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>-7.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.591</td>
<td>-0.332</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below Min. Price</td>
<td>1.609</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>4.902</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>2.252</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition × Below Min. Price</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>-4.111</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-2.876</td>
<td>-1.019</td>
<td>1.948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discount × Below Min. Price</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>-7.722</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.989</td>
<td>-0.588</td>
<td>0.788</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition × Discount × Below Min. Price</td>
<td>0.855</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>5.802</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>1.144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants Random Effect</td>
<td>1.770</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the conclusions are unchanged when considering this subset of participants.

**STUDY A3: REPLICATION OF THE BIDDING STUDY (STUDY 4) WITH COLLEGE STUDENTS**

**Design**

**Independent Variable, Dependent Variable, and Hypothesis**

All design elements were identical to Study 4, apart from the fact that the "Whole Foods" gift card was a "Bol.com" gift card for Dutch participants.

**Participants and exclusions**

We collected data from 490 college students enrolled in a Dutch and American university. As pre-registered, we excluded any participant who:

- Reported a maximum price that was smaller than the median bid (i.e., 32).
- Failed at least one comprehension question testing their understanding of the auction mechanism.

In total, we excluded 165 participants, and were left with 325 valid responses.
Analysis

Memory for Maximum Bid

We replicate the dispersion spillover: Participants reported seeing a maximum bid for the Amazon gift card that was on average $1.61 more when the dispersion of bids for the Whole Foods gift card was higher (vs. lower; t(323) = 5.04, p < .001, standardized b = 0.54). Figure 12 shows the cumulative distribution of the responses: When the bids for the Whole Foods gift card had a larger amount of dispersion, 23% of participants reported a maximum bid that was above the true maximum bid (i.e., $37). Only 6% of participants did so when the bids for the Whole Foods gift card had a smaller amount of dispersion (23% vs. 6%; χ(1) = 19.12, p < .001.

![Cumulative Distribution of Responses](image)

Bid Placed

As predicted, we observed a similar pattern on the amount of the bid that participants submitted for the Amazon gift card. Participants submit a bid that is on average $2.88 larger when the dispersion of bids for the Whole Foods gift card was high (vs. low; t(323) = 3.11, p = 0.002, standardized b = 0.34).
Robustness Checks on Full Data

Memory for Maximum Bid

We replicate the dispersion spillover: Participants reported seeing a maximum bid for the Amazon gift card that was on average $1.46 more when the dispersion of bids for the Whole Foods gift card was higher (vs. lower; $t(486) = 3.86, p < .001, standardized $b = 0.35$). When the bids for the Whole Foods gift card had a larger amount of dispersion, 24% of participants reported a maximum bid that was above the true maximum bid (i.e., $37). Only 7% of participants did so when the bids for the Whole Foods gift card had a smaller amount of dispersion (24% vs. 7%; $\chi^2(1) = 27.84, p < .001$).
Bid Placed

As predicted, we observed a similar pattern on the amount of the bid that participants submitted for the Amazon gift card. Participants submit a bid that is on average $2.32 larger when the dispersion of bids for the Whole Foods gift card was high (vs. low; t(486) = 2.79, p = 0.005, standardized b = 0.25).

![Diagram showing cumulative proportion of participants bid placed for Amazon gift card with different dispersions.]

STUDY A4: MODERATION OF DISPERSION SPILLOVER BY CATEGORY SIMILARITY

Design

Characteristics and distributions

Like in study 6, all participants saw two distributions:

- Red wines: SD manipulated between subjects σ ∈ [2.74, 9.65], constant Mean, μ = 28
- Second item: SD manipulated between subjects σ ∈ [2.74, 9.65], constant Mean, μ = 22

This study included another between-subjects factor: Similarity:

- For half of the participants, the second item was labeled "white wines" (high-similarity condition)
- For the other half, the second item was labeled "smartphone cases" (low-similarity condition)
In this study however, the two distributions partially overlapped:

![Graph showing overlap of distributions](image_url)

**Analysis**

Range of reported distributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>MixedLM</th>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Range of Reported Dist.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. Observations</td>
<td>1754</td>
<td>Method:</td>
<td>REML</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Groups:</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>Scale:</td>
<td>34.1884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. group size:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Log-Likelihood:</td>
<td>-5926.9405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max. group size:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Converged:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean group size:</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Coef.   | Std.Err. | z      | P>|z|   | [0.025 0.975] |
|---------|----------|--------|-------|---------------|
| Intercept | 21.862   | 0.207  | 105.405 | 0.000 | 21.455 22.269 |
The similarity of the labels assigned to the distribution has a significant impact on the range of the reported distribution:

- It increases the impact of the dispersion of the true distribution
- It weakens the impact of the dispersion of the other distribution
Simple Effects

**Dissimilar Labels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model:</th>
<th>MixedLM</th>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Range of Reported Dist.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. Observations:</td>
<td>1754</td>
<td>Method:</td>
<td>REML</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. Groups:</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>Scale:</td>
<td>34.1884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. group size:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Log-Likelihood:</td>
<td>-5926.9405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max. group size:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Converged:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean group size:</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                         | Coef.  | Std.Err. | z      | P>|z| | [0.025 | 0.975 |
|-------------------------|--------|----------|--------|------|--------|----------------|
| Intercept               | 21.063 | 0.291    | 72.262 | 0.000 | 20.491 | 21.634        |
| Focal Item: High vs. Low SD | 14.123 | 0.496    | 28.492 | 0.000 | 13.151 | 15.094        |
| Other Item: High vs. Low SD | 3.356  | 0.496    | 6.770  | 0.000 | 2.384  | 4.327         |
| Cumulative Impact of High vs. Low SD | 1.599 | 0.415    | 3.854  | 0.000 | 0.786  | 2.412         |
| Similarity: Low vs. High | -2.014 | 1.166    | -1.728 | 0.084 | -4.299 | 0.271         |
| Similarity × Focal Item | -1.492 | 0.707    | -2.108 | 0.035 | -2.878 | -0.105        |
| Similarity × Other Item | 1.557  | 0.707    | 2.201  | 0.028 | 0.171  | 2.944         |
| Three-Way Interaction   | -2.776 | 1.659    | -1.673 | 0.094 | -6.029 | 0.476         |
| Participant Random Effects | 20.617 | 0.437    |        |       |        |                |

Standardized Betas

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focal Item: High vs. Low SD</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Item: High vs. Low SD</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cumulative Impact of High vs. 0.16
Low SD
Similarity: Low vs. High -0.20
Similarity × Focal Item -0.15
Similarity × Other Item 0.15
Three-Way Interaction -0.27
Participant Random Effects 0.06
Web Appendix B - Supplementary Analysis

This notebook presents supplementary analysis mentioned in the paper, and provided during the review process. It is also available (in a nicer, more readable way) on the OSF repository of the paper: https://osf.io/hvxje/

**INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NULL EFFECTS REPORTED IN STUDY 5**

In Study 5, we find that when two distributions have different (vs. identical means):

- Participants' perception of the mean are not significantly influenced by the mean of the other distribution
- The range of the distributions reported by participants is not wider

In this section, we interpret those null effects by comparing them to the effects of the "dispersion spillover" observed in study 1C.

**Interpreting the Null Effect of "No Mean Spillover"**

In study 1C, we find that when the dispersion of the manipulated distribution is high (vs. medium):

- It increases the perceived standard deviation of the manipulated distribution by $d = 0.86$.
- It increases the perceived standard deviation of the common distribution by $d = 0.30$.

The ratio of those values is $R_\sigma = 0.35$. It suggests the magnitude of the "dispersion spillover" is roughly 1/3 of the increase in perceived dispersion for manipulated distribution. This estimate also matches the result of Study 6.

This gives us one credible benchmark against which to compare the "mean spillover": Do we find that the "mean spillover" is 1/3 of the increase in mean for the manipulated distribution in study 5?

In study 5, we find that when the mean of the manipulated distribution is high (vs. medium):

- It increases the perceived mean of the manipulated distribution by $d = 1.40$.
- It increases the perceived mean deviation of the common distribution by $d = 0.07$. 
The ratio of those values is $R_\mu = 0.05$.

A likelihood ratio test (Schnuerch and Erdfelder, 2020) suggests that the null is 9.6 times more likely than the alternative $R_\mu = R_\sigma$.

We therefore accept the null with $\alpha = .05$ and $1 - \beta = .90$

**Interpreting the Null Effect of "No Dispersion Spillover"**

In study 1C, we find that when the dispersion of the manipulated distribution is high (vs. medium), it increases the perceived standard deviation of the *common* distribution by 13.34%.

One way to explain this effect is a misattribution of values across distributions: People remember values from the "common" distribution as coming from the "manipulated" distribution, and vice versa. If this is true, we should also find a "dispersion spillover" in study 5 when the two distributions have different (vs. identical) means.

But what is the magnitude of the spillover that we should expect? The answer is complicated, but can be approached by the following steps.

1. We compute the number of "misattributed values" between the distributions presented in study 1C that would be consistent with this increase.

This suggests that at least 3 values would need to be swapped to generate this increase.
1. Next, we estimate the "dispersion spillover" that three "swaps" would imply in study 5

Our simulations show that if people misattribute three values from one distribution to the other, we should find that the perceived standard deviation increases by 19.82% when the two distributions have different (vs. identical) means (i.e., an effect size of $d = 0.43$)

1. Finally, we compare this implied effect size to the observed effect. In Study 5, we observed a reduction of 9.65% of the standard deviation when the two distributions have different (vs. identical) means (i.e., an effect size of $d = -0.24$).

Again, a likelihood ratio test (Schnuerch and Erdfelder, 2020) suggests that the null is 14.8 times more likely than the implied effect.

We therefore accept the null with $\alpha = .05$ and $1 - \beta = .90$.

**SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS FOR DISTRIBUTION BUILDER STUDIES**

In this section, we present consistent effects across other statistics of central tendencies (e.g., mode, median) and dispersion (e.g., SD, variance, IQR).

**Data Transformation of Distribution Builder Data**

In those studies, participants reported two distributions on two separate distribution builders, by spreading a fixed number of markers (representing bottles of wine) across different possible buckets (representing prices).
In the example above, the participant has allocated:

- 1 marker to price $13
- 1 marker to price $15
- 2 markers to price $17
- 5 markers to price $19
- 8 markers to price $21
- 5 markers to price $23
- 2 markers to price $25
- 1 marker to price $27
- 1 marker to price $29

The distribution corresponding to this allocation is therefore:


We then calculated, for each of the two distributions reported by participants, summary statistics of interest (e.g. the standard deviation in Study 2 and 3, the mean in Study 8).

Those summary statistics constitute our dependent variables.
Study 1B

Participants saw two distributions: one for white wines and the other for red wines.

- One distribution (the "Common" distribution) had constant dispersion across subjects ($\sigma = 4.5$)
- The other (the "Manipulated" distribution) had a variable level of dispersion manipulated between subjects (Low: $\sigma = 1.1$, Medium: $\sigma = 4.5$, or High: $\sigma = 7.5$)

All distributions had a constant mean ($\mu = 25$).

This time, the distributions were presented in a blocked order.

The graph below describes the distributions reported by participants:

For each distribution reported by participants, we computed the following statistics of interest:

- Mean
- SD
- Variance
- Interquartile Range (IQR)
- Minimum
- Maximum
- Range

We regressed those statistics on the following predictors:

- One factor indicating the type of the distribution (Dummy-coded: "Manipulated vs. Common")
- One factor indicating the amount of dispersion in the "Manipulated" distribution (Dummy-coded: "High vs. Moderate" and "Low vs. Moderate")
- The interaction of those factors
- A random intercept for each participant

The conditional effects for each of the two categories (manipulated vs. common) are presented in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Var</th>
<th>IQR</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moderate***</td>
<td>(0.397)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td>(2.605)</td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
<td>(0.513)</td>
<td>(0.611)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate***</td>
<td>(0.397)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td>(2.605)</td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
<td>(0.513)</td>
<td>(0.611)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common: High vs.</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td>11.067</td>
<td>1.191</td>
<td>-0.914</td>
<td>1.777</td>
<td>2.691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate**</td>
<td>(0.571)</td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
<td>(3.743)</td>
<td>(0.491)</td>
<td>(0.654)</td>
<td>(0.737)</td>
<td>(0.878)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common: Low vs.</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>-0.598</td>
<td>-5.788</td>
<td>-1.356</td>
<td>1.063</td>
<td>-0.486</td>
<td>-1.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate**</td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
<td>(0.491)</td>
<td>(0.654)</td>
<td>(0.737)</td>
<td>(0.878)</td>
<td>(0.737)</td>
<td>(0.878)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulated: High vs. Moderate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.316 ***</td>
<td>1.525 ***</td>
<td>19.551 ***</td>
<td>2.140 ***</td>
<td>-3.129 ***</td>
<td>1.846 *</td>
<td>4.975 ***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.568)</td>
<td>(0.271)</td>
<td>(3.722)</td>
<td>(0.488)</td>
<td>(0.650)</td>
<td>(0.733)</td>
<td>(0.873)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manipulated: Low vs. Moderate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-0.073 ***</td>
<td>-2.016 ***</td>
<td>-14.365 ***</td>
<td>-2.981 ***</td>
<td>3.416 ***</td>
<td>-3.656 ***</td>
<td>-7.072 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.568)</td>
<td>(0.271)</td>
<td>(3.722)</td>
<td>(0.488)</td>
<td>(0.650)</td>
<td>(0.733)</td>
<td>(0.873)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Random Effect Var</td>
<td>(0.422)</td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
<td>(2.814)</td>
<td>(0.366)</td>
<td>(0.628)</td>
<td>(0.439)</td>
<td>(0.665)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance key:  • <.1   * <.05   ** <.01   *** <.001

We observe the following:

- People's impression of dispersion for the manipulated distribution is appropriately affected by the amount of dispersion presented in this distribution.
- A High (vs. Medium) amount of dispersion in the manipulated distribution has a significant impact on the subjective amount of dispersion for the common distribution. This effect is directionally consistent across different operationalizations of dispersion (SD, var, IQR, min, max, range).
- A Low (vs. Medium) has a much smaller impact on the subjective amount of dispersion for the common distribution.

Statistics of central tendencies
Statistics of dispersion
Study 1C

Participants saw two distributions: one for pillows and the other for blankets.

- One distribution (the "Common" distribution) had constant dispersion across subjects ($\sigma = 4.5$)
- The other (the "Manipulated" distribution) had a variable level of dispersion manipulated between subjects (Low: $\sigma = 1.1$, Medium: $\sigma = 4.5$, or High: $\sigma = 7.5$)

All distributions had a constant mean ($\mu = 25$).

The graph below describes the distributions reported by participants:

For each distribution reported by participants, we computed the following statistics of interest:

- Mean
- SD
- Variance
• Interquartile Range (IQR)
• Minimum
• Maximum
• Range

We regressed those statistics on the following predictors:

• One factor indicating the type of the distribution (Dummy-coded: "Manipulated vs. Common")
• One factor indicating the amount of dispersion in the "Manipulated" distribution (Dummy-coded: "High vs. Moderate" and "Low vs. Moderate")
• The interaction of those factors
• A random intercept for each participant

The conditional effects for each of the two categories (manipulated vs. common) are presented in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Var</th>
<th>IQR</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
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<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
<td>(3.233)</td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
<td>(0.381)</td>
<td>(0.419)</td>
<td>(0.584)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
<td>(3.233)</td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
<td>(0.381)</td>
<td>(0.419)</td>
<td>(0.584)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common: High vs. Moderate</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.650</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>6.800</td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>-1.451</td>
<td>1.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.394)</td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
<td>(4.596)</td>
<td>(0.526)</td>
<td>(0.541)</td>
<td>(0.596)</td>
<td>(0.831)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common: Low vs. Moderate</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>5.033</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.394)</td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
<td>(4.596)</td>
<td>(0.526)</td>
<td>(0.541)</td>
<td>(0.596)</td>
<td>(0.831)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We observe the following:

- People's impression of dispersion for the manipulated distribution is appropriately affected by the amount of dispersion presented in this distribution.

- A High (vs. Medium) amount of dispersion in the manipulated distribution has a significant impact on the subjective amount of dispersion for the common distribution. This effect is directionally consistent across different operationalizations of dispersion (SD, var, IQR, min, max, range).

Statistics of central tendencies
Statistics of dispersion
Study 5

Participants saw two distributions of wine prices: one for red wines and the other for white wines.

- One distribution (the "Common" distribution) had constant mean across subjects ($\mu = 25$)
- The other (the "Manipulated" distribution) had a variable mean manipulated between subjects (Low: $\mu = 15$, Medium: $\mu = 25$, High: $\mu = 35$)

All distributions had a constant amount of dispersion ($\sigma = 4.5$).

The graph below describes the distributions reported by participants:

For each distribution reported by participants, we computed the following statistics of interest:

- Mean
- SD
- Variance
- Interquartile Range (IQR)
• Minimum
• Maximum
• Range

We regressed those statistics on the following predictors:

• One factor indicating the type of the distribution (Dummy-coded: "Manipulated vs. Common")
• One factor indicating the mean of the "Manipulated" distribution (Dummy-coded: "High vs. Moderate" and "Low vs. Moderate")
• The interaction of those factors
• A random intercept for each participant

The conditional effects for each of the two categories (manipulated vs. common) are presented in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Var</th>
<th>IQR</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common: Moderate</td>
<td>25.539</td>
<td>5.424</td>
<td>34.030</td>
<td>7.959</td>
<td>16.429</td>
<td>34.429</td>
<td>18.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.520)</td>
<td>(0.313)</td>
<td>(4.434)</td>
<td>(0.585)</td>
<td>(0.673)</td>
<td>(0.765)</td>
<td>(1.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulated: Moderate</td>
<td>24.731</td>
<td>5.358</td>
<td>34.781</td>
<td>7.837</td>
<td>15.449</td>
<td>33.000</td>
<td>17.551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
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<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.520)</td>
<td>(0.313)</td>
<td>(4.434)</td>
<td>(0.585)</td>
<td>(0.673)</td>
<td>(0.765)</td>
<td>(1.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common: High vs. Moderate</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>-0.442</td>
<td>-5.995</td>
<td>-0.575</td>
<td>1.610 •</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>-1.462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.725)</td>
<td>(0.436)</td>
<td>(6.179)</td>
<td>(0.815)</td>
<td>(0.938)</td>
<td>(1.066)</td>
<td>(1.421)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common: Low vs. Moderate</td>
<td>-0.677</td>
<td>-0.605</td>
<td>-9.008</td>
<td>-1.043</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>-0.929</td>
<td>-1.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.739)</td>
<td>(0.445)</td>
<td>(6.303)</td>
<td>(0.831)</td>
<td>(0.957)</td>
<td>(1.088)</td>
<td>(1.450)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Manipulated: High vs. Moderate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.625</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>-3.614</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>8.859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.725)</td>
<td>(0.436)</td>
<td>(6.179)</td>
<td>(0.815)</td>
<td>(0.938)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Manipulated: Low vs. Moderate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-8.459</td>
<td>-0.295</td>
<td>-6.937</td>
<td>-0.628</td>
<td>-7.491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.739)</td>
<td>(0.445)</td>
<td>(6.303)</td>
<td>(0.831)</td>
<td>(0.957)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Random Effect Var

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.391)</td>
<td>(0.519)</td>
<td>(8.439)</td>
<td>(0.829)</td>
<td>(0.606)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance key:  • <.1  * <.05  ** <.01  *** <.001

We observe the following:

• The true mean of the manipulated distribution has a significant impact on the mean of the manipulated distribution reported by participants.

• In contrast, the mean, median or mode of the common distribution that participants report are not affected by the mean of the "Manipulated" distribution, which suggests that participants made a distinction between the central tendency of the two distributions.

• Mean-independent statistics of dispersion (SD, var, IQR and range) are also not affected by our manipulations of the mean, which is inconsistent with what an exemplar-based model of judgment would have predicted.

Statistics of central tendencies
Statistics of dispersion
Study 6

Participants saw two distributions of wine prices: one for red wines and the other for white wines.

- The variance of each distribution was orthogonally manipulated between-subjects to be "Low" (\(\sigma = 1.78\)) or "High" (\(\sigma = 5.37\))
- The mean price of each distribution was held constant between-subjects, and was such that the two distributions did not overlap: (\(\mu\) for white wines = 12, \(\mu\) for red wines = 38).

The graph below describes the (mean-centered) distributions reported by participants:

For each distribution reported by participants, we computed the following statistics of interest:

- Mean
- SD
- Variance
- Interquartile Range (IQR)
- Minimum
We regressed those statistics on the following predictors:

- One factor indicating the dispersion of this "Given" distribution ("Low": -0.5, "High": 0.5)
- One factor indicating the dispersion of the "Other" distribution that the participant learned ("Low": -0.5, "High": 0.5)
- The interaction of those factors
- A random intercept for each participant

The results are presented in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Var</th>
<th>IQR</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Intercept | 22.904 | 5.061 | 35.165 | 7.548 | 14.678 | 31.121 | 16.442
|         | ***   | ***   | ***   | ***   | ***   | ***   |
|         | (0.467) | (0.152) | (2.256) | (0.289) | (0.538) | (0.596) | (0.416) |
| Focal Item: High vs. Low SD | -0.281 | 1.792 | 14.340 | 2.362 | -3.495 | 3.198 | 6.692 |
|         | ***   | ***   | ***   | ***   | **    | ***   |
|         | (0.931) | (0.258) | (3.839) | (0.494) | (1.002) | (1.089) | (0.707) |
| Other Item: High vs. Low SD | -0.549 | 0.516 * | 3.941 | 0.407 | -2.002 * | 0.581 | 2.583 |
|         | ***   |       |       |       |       |       |
|         | (0.931) | (0.258) | (3.839) | (0.494) | (1.002) | (1.089) | (0.707) |
| Cumulative Impact of High vs. Low SD | 0.126 | -0.737 | -8.084 | -0.718 | 1.371 | -1.079 | -2.450 |
|         | (1.869) | (0.608) | (9.025) | (1.155) | (2.150) | (2.384) | (1.665) |
| Participants | 0.970 | 3.785 | 821.876 | 13.136 | 22.103 | 34.126 | 28.128 |
| Random Effect Var | N.C. | (0.319) | (4.702) | (0.594) | N.C. | N.C. | (0.870) |
Significance key:  • <.1  * <.05  ** <.01  *** <.001

As the distributions of Means, Median, Mode, Maximum, and Minimum are bimodal, some convergence issues arise when estimating parameters in the mixed linear model (indicated by N.C. in the table).

An OLS specification gives similar results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Var</th>
<th>IQR</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
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<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.464)</td>
<td>(0.484)</td>
<td>(0.518)</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(1.929)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(0.476)</td>
<td>(0.503)</td>
<td>(0.355)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focal</td>
<td>-0.281</td>
<td>-0.395</td>
<td>-1.226</td>
<td>1.792</td>
<td>14.340</td>
<td>2.362</td>
<td>-3.495</td>
<td>3.198</td>
<td>6.692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item: High vs. Low</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>(0.928)</td>
<td>(0.967)</td>
<td>(1.037)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td>(3.857)</td>
<td>(0.496)</td>
<td>(0.952)</td>
<td>(1.005)</td>
<td>(0.711)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-0.549</td>
<td>-0.367</td>
<td>-0.336</td>
<td>0.516</td>
<td>3.941</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>-2.002</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td>2.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item: High vs. Low</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>(0.928)</td>
<td>(0.967)</td>
<td>(1.037)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td>(3.857)</td>
<td>(0.496)</td>
<td>(0.952)</td>
<td>(1.005)</td>
<td>(0.711)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Impact of High vs. Low SD</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>-0.297</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>-0.737</td>
<td>-8.084</td>
<td>-0.718</td>
<td>1.371</td>
<td>-1.079</td>
<td>-2.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We replicate the dispersion spillover, in a context where the two distributions do not overlap:

- The dispersion of a "Focal" distribution has a significant impact on the dispersion of prices reported by participants for this "Focal" distribution.
- The dispersion of the "Other" distribution that was simultaneously presented also affects the dispersion of prices reported by participants.
- Those effects are directionally consistent across different operationalizations of dispersion (SD, var, IQR, min, max, range).

**Study A4**

Participants saw two distributions of prices.

- We manipulated between-subjects the label assigned to each distribution so that they describe "Similar" products (white wines/red wines) or "Dissimilar" products (smartphone cases/red wines)
- The variance of each distribution was orthogonally manipulated between-subjects to be "Low" ($\sigma = 2.7$) or "High" ($\sigma = 9.6 \, \sigma$)
- The mean price of each distribution was held constant between-subjects ($\mu$ for white wines and smartphone cases = 23, $\mu$ for red wines = 28)

The graph below describes the distributions reported by participants in the "Similar" and "Dissimilar" conditions:
Similar items

Focal Item: Low Var

Focal Item: High Var

Legend:
- Reported Distributions (Blue Mean Centered)
- Gaussian Average Distribution (Blue Mean Centered)
- 95% CI of Gaussian Average
- 95% CI of True Distribution
For each distribution reported by participants, we computed the following statistics of interest:

- Mean
- SD
- Variance
- Interquartile Range (IQR)
- Minimum
- Maximum
- Range

We regressed those statistics on the following predictors:

- One factor indicating the dispersion of this "Focal" distribution ("Low": -0.5, "High": 0.5)
- One factor indicating the dispersion of the "Other" distribution that the participant learned ("Low": -0.5, "High": 0.5)
• The interaction of those factors
• A random intercept for each participant

The results are presented in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Var</th>
<th>IQR</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
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<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.815)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focal Item: High vs.</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>3.571</td>
<td>42.678</td>
<td>4.780</td>
<td>-7.055</td>
<td>6.322</td>
<td>13.377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low SD</td>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(1.414)</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
<td>(0.354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Item: High vs.</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>1.276</td>
<td>15.814</td>
<td>2.026</td>
<td>-1.927</td>
<td>2.207</td>
<td>4.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low SD</td>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(1.414)</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
<td>(0.354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Impact of</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td>3.767</td>
<td>0.478</td>
<td>-0.596</td>
<td>1.003</td>
<td>1.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High vs. Low SD</td>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(1.631)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td>(0.300)</td>
<td>(0.415)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similarity: Similar</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>-0.633</td>
<td>-3.796</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>2.014</td>
<td>-1.389</td>
<td>-3.403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vs. Dissimilar</td>
<td></td>
<td>**</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.411)</td>
<td>(0.235)</td>
<td>(3.261)</td>
<td>(0.417)</td>
<td>(0.533)</td>
<td>(0.600)</td>
<td>(0.830)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focal Item × Similarity</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.484</td>
<td>-4.577</td>
<td>-0.863</td>
<td>0.768</td>
<td>-0.724</td>
<td>-1.492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.411)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
<td>(2.828)</td>
<td>(0.372)</td>
<td>(0.505)</td>
<td>(0.566)</td>
<td>(0.707)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Item × Similarity</td>
<td>-0.854</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>4.986</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>-1.305</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>1.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We observe the following:

- The dispersion of a "Focal" distribution has a significant impact on the dispersion of prices reported by participants for this "Focal" distribution.
- The dispersion of the "Other" distribution that was simultaneously presented also affects the dispersion of prices reported by participants.
- The impact of the "Focal" distribution is weaker (stronger) for items that are similar (dissimilar)
- The impact of the "Other" distribution is stronger (weaker) for items that are similar (dissimilar)
- Those effects are directionally consistent across different operationalizations of dispersion (SD, var, IQR, min, max, range).

**HOW DO PEOPLE CONSTRUCT DISTRIBUTIONS?**

In the review process, reviewers inquired about how people construct distributions over time.

We recorded this information in Study 1C.

**Descriptive Graph**

The graph below visualizes four clusters of "construction strategy".
Participants overall start from the left of the distribution builder, and work their way to the right.

**Construction Strategies and Accuracy**

We do not find that construction strategy (measured for instance as the ordinal position of the first market in the final distribution) is predictive of the accuracy of the final distribution.
Ordinal Position of First Marker

\[ p = 0.424 \]
Z-Score of First Marker

\[ p = 0.742 \]
Regression Coefficient between Marker Order and Marker Z-Score

(A positive coefficient indicates that the distribution is constructed mostly left-to-right, a negative coefficient mostly right-to-left)